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Authentication or identification of real evidence refers 
to the requirement of proving that an item of evidence is 
genuine, i.e., that it is what its proponent claims it to be. 
McCormick expressed the requirement in this way: 
"[W]hen real evidence is offered an adequate foundation 
for admission will require testimony first that the object 
offered is the object which was involved in the incident, 
and further that the condition of the object is substantial-
ly unchanged." 2 C. McCormick, Evidence 8 (4th ed. 1992) 
EVIDENCE RULE 901 
Federal Evidence Rule 901(a) codifies this requirement: 
''The requirement of authentication or identification as a 
condition precedent to admissibility is satisfied by 
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in 
question is what its proponent claims." The Ohio rule is 
identical. 
Identity of Evidence 
It is often necessary to show that the item seized at a 
crime scene or place of arrest, such as drugs, was the 
same item analyzed at the crime laboratory and 
introduced at trial. There are two principal methods of 
proving the identity of real evidence: first, establishing 
that the evidence is "readily identifiable," and second, 
establishing a "chain of custody." 
Both methods are discussed later in this article. 
Condition of Evidence 
In addition to showing that the object introduced in 
evidence is the same object as the one involved in the 
crime, the proponent of the evidence must show that the 
object has retained its relevant evidentiary characteris-
tics. Alteration of the item may reduce or negate its 
probative value and may mislead the jury. Thus, before 
physical objects are admissible in evidence the propo-
nent must establish that they are in "substantially the 
same condition as when the crime was committed." 
Gallego v. United States, 276 F.2d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 1960). 
Accord United States v. Harrington, 923 F.2d 1371, 1374 
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 164 (1991); United 
States v. Zink, 612 F.2d 511, 514 (10th Cir. 1980) ("condi-
tion is materially unchanged"). 
ublic Defender Hyman Friedman 
Determining what changes are "substantial" depends 
on how the changes affect the relevance of the evidence. 
Radically altered items of evidence may still be admitted 
if their pertinent features remain unaltered: 
Even though the object is not in exactly the same 
condition at trial as at the time in issue- or even if 
in substantially the same condition- the exhibit 
may still be admitted if the changes can be 
explained, and they do not destroy the evidentiary 
value of the object. Comment, "Preconditions for 
Admission of Demonstrative Evidence," 61 Nw. U.L. 
Rev. 472, 484 (1966). 
McCormick said it this way: "It should, however, always 
be borne in mind that foundational requirements are 
essentially requirements of logic, and not rules of art.. 
Thus, e.g., even a radically altered item of real evidence 
may be admissible if its pertinent features remain 
unaltered." 2 C. McCormick, supra at 8-9. 
For example, in United States v. Skelley, 501 F.2d 447 
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1051 (1974), counterfeit 
bills were admissible even though they apparently 
changed color due to tests for fingerprints. According to 
the court, the change in color did not "destroy the rele-
vance of the bills to show their counterfeit character from 
the identity of serial numbers, and their competence as 
evidence for this purpose [was) unimpaired by the ... 
possibility of a change in color." /d. at 451. 
See also Davidson v. State, 208 Ga. 834, 836, 69 
S.E.2d 757, 759 (1952) (victim's clothing admissible 
although washed); Bruce v. State, 268 Ind. 180, 238,375 
N.E.2d 1042, 1073 (1978) (contamination "in no way vitiat-
ed the evidentiary value of the exhibits"), cert. denied, 
439 u.s. 988 (1978). 
READILY IDENTIFIABLE EVIDENCE 
If an object is easily identified, there may be no need to 
establish a chain of custody. McCormick refers to such 
items as "unique and readily identifiable." 2 C. McCormick, 
supra at 8. As one Ohio court has noted: 
If an exhibit is directly identified by a witness as the 
object which is involved in the case, then that direct 
identification is sufficient. Such is the case with 
Telephone (216) 443-7223 
uyahoga County Public Defender Office, 1200 Ontario Street, Cleveland, Ohio 44113 
7e views expressed herein are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of the Public Defender. 
opyright © 1993 Paul Giannelli 
many objects which have special identifying charac-
teristics, such as a number or mark, or are made to 
have such identifying characteristics by special marks. 
State v._Conley, 32 Ohio App. 2d 54, 59, 288 N.E.2d 
296, 300 (1971). 
See also United States v. LePera, 443 F.2d 810, 813 (9th 
Cir.) ("Counterfeit notes ... printed from a single plate, 
are unique and identifiable without proof of a chain of 
custody"), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 958 (1971); United 
States v. Blue, 440 F.2d 300, 303 (7th Cir.) ("The chain of 
custody is not relevant when a witness identifies the 
object as the actual object about which he has testified"), 
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 836 (1971); State v. Malone, 694 
S.W.2d 723, 727 (Mo. 1985) (chain of custody not required 
if there is a positive identification), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 
1165 (1986). 
The Federal Rules recognize this method of identifica-
tion. Rule 901(b)(4), entitled "Distinctive characteristics 
and the like," provides that "[a]ppearance, contents, sub-
stance, internal patterns, or other distinctive characteris-
tics, taken in conjunction with circumstances" may satisfy 
the authentication requirement. The Ohio rule is identical. 
Numerous examples of authenticating readily identifia-
ble objects are found in the cases. All of these examples 
involve objects whose characteristics somehow make 
them unique. 
Serially Numbered Items 
First, any item imprinted with a serial number, such as 
a weapon or dollar bill, may be identified by that number. 
E.g., Calderon v. United States, 269 F.2d 416, 419 (10th 
Cir. 1959) (money); Jackson v. State, 241 Ark. 850, 854, 
410 S.W.2d 766, 769 (1967) (gun); State v. Conley, 32 Ohio 
App. 2d 54, 60, 288 N.E.2d 296, 300-01 (1971) (money); 
State v. Kroeplin, 266 N.W.2d 537, 540 (N.D. 1978) (gun). 
Police Markings 
Second, an object that is inscribed with the initials or 
markings of a police officer or other person may be readi-
ly identifiable. In such cases, the person converts a non-
unique object into a readily identifiable one by placing 
distinctive markings on it. This practice is recommended 
in crime scene and evidence collection manuals. See 
Federal Bureau of Investigation, Handbook of Forensic 
Science 100 (rev. ed. 1984); C. O'Hara, Fundamentals of 
Criminal Investigation 79-84 (5th ed. 1980). 
This method of identification is also well accepted in 
the cases. Numerous items have been admitted under 
this method: 
Firearms: United States v. Madril, 445 F.2d 827, 828 
(9th Cir. 1971} (pistol), vacated on other grounds, 404 
U.S. 1010 (1972); Dixon v. State, 2431nd. 654, 656-57, 
189 N.E.2d 715, 716 (1963) (shotgun). 
Bullets: Sims v. State, 243 Ga. 83, 85, 252 S.E.2d 501, 
503 (1979); State v. Ross, 275 N.C. 550, 553-54, 169 
S.E.2d 875, 878 (1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 1050 
(1970). See also Almodovar v. State, 464 N.E.2d 906, 
911 (Ind. 1984) (initials scratched on shell casing). 
Currency: United States v. Capocci, 433 F.2d 155, 157 
(1st Cir. 1970) (counterfeit bill); United States v. Bouras-
sa, 411 F.2d 69, 72-73 (10th Cir.) (coin), cert. denied, 
396 U.S. 915 (1969); Rosemund v. United States, 386 
2 
F.2d 412, 412 (10th Cir. 1967) (stolen money). 
Laboratory slides: Gass v. United States, 416 F.2d 767, 
770 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Wheeler v. United States, 211 F.2d 
19, 22-23 (D.C. Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 1019 
(1954); State v. Romo, 66 Ariz. 174, 178-80, 185 P.2d 
757, 759-61 (1947). 
Distinctive Items 
Third, an object may possess distinctive natural 
characteristics which may make it readily identifiable. 
E.g., United States v. Reed, 392 F.2d 865, 867 (7th Cir.) 
("very unusual looking hat"), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 984 
(1968); Reyes v. United States, 383 F.2d 734, 734 (9th Cir. 
1967) (holdup note "was unique and readily identifiable"). 
For example, in United States v. Briddle, 443 F.2d 443 
(8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 942 (1971), the prosecu-
tion introduced evidence that a button top found at the 
scene of a burglary came from the defendant's coat. The 
police officer described the button as follows: 
It had a picture of a whale on the front of it. It was 
leather ... And it had a sticky substance on the back, 
as though it might have been stuck to something ... 
It was a dark brown in color. Had a whale or fish on it. 
The tail was up in the air. Split. And I believe it was the 
left eye of the animal that was up. /d. at 448. 
The Eighth Circuit held this identification sufficient: 
"Given the uniqueness of the buttons on Briddle's coat, 
we think this identification evidence established that the 
exhibit ... was the button top found at the scene of 
the burglary." /d. at 449. 
Thus, the issue is whether the distinctive characteris-
tics are sufficient to make it unlikely that another object 
would have the same characteristics. 
Witness' Uncertainty 
A witness' uncertainty in identifying an exhibit, 
however, affects the weight, not the admissibility, of the 
evidence. For example, the Ninth Circuit has written: 
[A]Ithough the trial record reveals the identification of 
the ax made by Papse may not have been entirely free 
from doubt, the witness did state that he was "pretty 
sure" this was the weapon Johnson had used against 
him, that he saw the ax in Johnson's hand, and that he 
was personally familiar with this particular ax because 
he had used it in the past. Based on Papse's testimony, 
a reasonable juror could have found that his ax was 
the weapon allegedly used in the assault. Papse's 
ability or inability to specify particular identifying 
features of the ax, as well as the evidence of the ax's 
alleged changed condition, should then go to the 
question of weight to be accorded this evidence, which 
is precisely what the trial court ruled. In other words, 
although the jury remained free to reject the govern-
ment's assertion that this ax had been used in the 
assault, the requirements for admissibility specified in 
Rule 901(a) had been met. United States v. Johnson, 
637 F.2d 1224, 1247-48 (9th Cir. 1980). 
Accord Howland v. State, 51 Wis. 2d 162, 171, 186 
N.W.2d 319, 323 (1971) ("[T]he witness' lack of certitude f 
as to whether the objects offered are the ones he saw on 
a prior occasion goes to the weight the jury should give 
to the evidence, but lack of certitude does not preclude 
admissibility"). 
CHAIN OF CUSTODY 
The use of a chain of custody to authenticate evidence 
is well established in criminal trials. Nevertheless, two 
commentators have written that the governing federal 
rule "can easily be read as doing away with any chain of 
custody requirement." 2 S. Saltzburg & M. Martin, Feder-
al Rules of Evidence Manual 478 (5th ed. 1990) (citing 
Fed. R. Evid. 901(a)). This seems doubtful. If anything, 
there is a need for more stringent requirements. The 
mass processing of immunoassay tests and the increasing 
volume of DNA testing heightens the importance of proper 
handling procedures. Indeed, improper labeling was the 
cause of an error in a DNA proficiency test. Thompson, 
"The Myth of DNA Fingerprints," 9 Cal. La.w. 34 (Apr. 
1989) (Cell mark official admitted that the "error occurred 
because a lab technician incorrectly labeled a vial"). 
In some situations the proponent must establish a 
chain of custody. Proof of the chain of custody may be 
necessary either because the item of evidence is not 
readily identifiable, or because more than simple identifi-
cation is necessary to establish the item's relevance. 
Fungible Objects 
First, a chain of custody is often required for fungible 
evidence because these items have no unique charac-
teristics. The inability to distinguish between fungible 
items makes positive identification by observation alone 
impossible. See State v. Conley, 32 Ohio App. 2d 54, 59, 
288 N.E.2d 296, 300 (1971) ("One white pill looks much 
like any other white pill and hence positive identification 
simply by observation is usually impossible"). 
In addition, the nature of these items frequently makes 
them particularly susceptible to tampering or loss. As 
one court has noted, the "danger of tampering, loss, or 
mistake with respect to an exhibit is greatest where the 
exhibit is small and is one which has J:?hysical charac-
teristics fungible in nature and similar in form to 
substances familiar to people in their daily lives." 
Graham v. State, 2531nd. 525, 531, 255 N.E.2d 652, 655 
(1970). See also United States v. LePera, 443 F.2d 810, 
812-13 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 958 (1971) 
("Narcotic drugs are fungible and, being such, evidence 
of a continuous chain of possession is often necessary ... "). 
Nevertheless, the proper handling of fungible evidence 
- using lock-sealed envelopes that "can be opened only 
by destroying the seals" - makes the evidence readily 
identifiable and eliminates most problems of misidentifi-
cation and contamination. United States v. Santiago, 534 
F.2d 768, 770 (7th Cir. 1976). 
Laboratory Analysis 
Second, if the relevance of an exhibit depends on its 
subsequent laboratory analysis, identification by police 
markings made at the scene does not provide a sufficient 
foundation. The markings establish that the exhibit in 
court was the item seized by the police, but a chain of · 
custody may be necessary to establish that the item 
seized was the item analyzed at the crime laboratory. 
For example, in Robinson v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 
136, 183 S.E.2d 179 (1971), the court reversed a rape 
conviction due to a break in the chain of custody: "The 
mere fact that the blouse and the panties were identified 
[by the victim at trial] did not prove the chain of posses-
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sian necessary to validate the F.B.I. analysis of them." /d. 
at 139, 183 S.E.2d at 181. See also Graham v. State, 253 
Ind. 525, 532-34, 255 N.E.2d 652, 655-56 (1970) (wrapper 
containing white powder initialed at time police took 
possession but break in chain of custody prior to 
chemical analysis resulted in reversal). 
Condition of Object 
Third, if the condition of the object, not merely its iden-
tity, is the relevant issue, a chain of custody may be 
required to establish that the object has not been altered 
during police custody. This requirement is a necessary 
safeguard for evidence that is susceptible to undetected 
contamination or deterioration, such as blood samples. 
See Lynch v. State, 687 S.W.2d 76, 78 (Tex. App. 1985) 
(chain of custody required for blood in a criminal case); 
Ritter v. State, 3 Tenn. Grim. App. 372, 462 S.W.2d 247, 
249 (1970) ("Blood specimens ... should be handled 
with the greatest of care and all persons who handle the 
specimen should be ready to identify it and testify to its 
custody and unchanged condition"). 
See also Glendening & Waugh, "The Stability of Ordi-
nary Blood Alcohol Samples Held Various Periods of 
Time Under Different Conditions," 10 J. Forensic Sci. 
192, 199 (1965) (showing instability of alcohol content in 
blood samples for different temperatures and storage 
periods). 
LENGTH OF CHAIN OF CUSTODY 
When a chain of custody is required, either to show 
the identity of the item or its unchanged condition, it is 
necessary to determine where the chain begins and 
ends. Only breaks in possession that occur within the 
period included in the chain of custody affect admissibility. 
The Initial Link 
Disputes over the initial link in the chain of custody 
focus on whether the continuous possession require-
ment should apply at the time of the incident at issue or 
at the time when the evidence comes into possession of 
its proponent. According to one position, a "chain-of-
custody foundation is not required ... for periods before 
the evidence comes into the possession of law enforce-
ment personnel." Williams v. State, 269 Ind. 265, 269-70, 
379 N.E.2d 981, 984 (1978). The theory underlying this 
rule is that "the State cannot be charged with the respon-
sibility of accounting for the custody of the exhibit" when 
it is not in its possession. Zupp v. State, 258 Ind. 625, 
629, 283 N.E.2d 540,543 (1972). 
This rule has been applied in two different types of 
cases: first-, those in which a third party had possession 
of the object prior to the time it was turned over to the 
police, Zupp v. State, 258 Ind. 625, 629-30, 283 N.E.2d 
540, 543 {1972), and second, those in which the object 
was not discovered at the crime scene until sometime 
after the commission of the crime. Williams v. State, 269 
Ind. 265, 269-70, 379 N.E.2d 981, 984 (1978) (three-hour 
delay in discovery of revolver); Thornton v. State, 268 Ind. 
456,459-60,376 N.E.2d 492,494 (1978) (knife discovered 
in open field subsequent to arrest). 
This position misconceives the purpose of the chain of 
custody rule. The rule is not designed to hold the police 
accountable, but rather to ensure that evidence is relevant. 
Police accountability is a means to this end. If the rele-
vance of an object depends on its use in a crime, the 
offering party must establish, through a chain of custody 
or otherwise, a connection between that object and the 
crime. For example, if a third party finds a rifle near a 
cl-ime scene and turns it over to the police several hours 
or days after the crime, it would be necessary to "account" 
for the rifle during the time it was in the third party's 
possession in order to tie the rifle to the place where the 
crime occurred. 
For example, in United States v. White, 569 F.2d 263 
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 848 (1978), the court 
noted: "This is not a routine chain of custody situation in 
which the chain is broken between seizure of the evidence 
from the accused and a subsequent trial. Rather, the 
alleged break occurred before the government came into 
possession of the heroin." /d. at 266. After citing the rule 
in the "typical chain of custody cases," the court wrote: 
"We apply the same rule in the instant case." /d. 
See also United States v. Cyphers, 553 F.2d 1064, 1073. 
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 843 (1977) (2 to 3-hour 
gap before evidence seized); People v. Brown, 115 
A.D.2d 610, 610, 496 N.Y.S.2d 272, 272 (1985) (piece of 
rug recovered five days after crime held inadmissible). 
The Final Link 
Disagreement over the point at which the chain of 
custody ends focuses on whether the chain ends when 
the item is introduced at trial or at an earlier stage, e.g., 
when a laboratory analyzes the item. Some commenta-
tors have read several cases as requiring the prosecution 
to trace the chain of custody from the time of seizure until 
the time of trial in all cases. See An not., 21 A.L.R.2d 
1216, 1236 (1952). There may be some support for this 
view in the Advisory Committee's Note to Federal Rule 
901, where the drafters refer to "establishing narcotics as 
taken from an accused and accounting for custody through 
the period until trial, including laboratory analysis." 
The "length" of the chain of custody, however, 
depends on the purpose for which the evidence is 
offered. This point is illustrated by State v. Conley, Ohio 
App. 2d 54, 288 N.E.2d 296 (1971), which involved a 
prosecution for the illegal sale of LSD. The drugs were 
purchased with marked bills whose serial numbers had 
been recorded. The defendant objected to both the 
admissibility of the bills and the LSD. The court wrote: 
To identify a particular item ... as being part of a perti-
nent incident in the past usually requires the showing 
of a continuous chain of custodians up to the material 
moment. When a chemical analysis is involved ... the 
material moment is the moment of analysis, since this 
provides the basis for the expert testimony and makes 
that testimony relevant to the case. In the case of many 
other items, the material moment occurs at the trial. /d. 
at 59-60,288 N.E.2d at 300. 
The court went on to hold that the chain of custody for the 
marked bills ran from the time the bills were marked until 
the trial, at which time they were identified. The chain of 
custody for the drugs differed; it ran from the time of 
seizure to the time of chemical analysis. 
As a matter of relevancy, this approach is sound. The 
loss or destruction of the drugs after chemical analysis 
would not affect the relevance of the expert's testimony 
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concerning the nature of the drugs. See United States v. 
Bailey, 277 F.2d 560, 565 (7th Cir. 1960) ("Even if the 
exhibits, including the heroin, had not been introduced in 
evidence the testimony of the witnesses and the stipula-
tion as to the chemical analysis were sufficient ... "). 
Moreover, the prosecution generally is not required to 
introduce real evidence in order to prove its case: 
It is not always necessary that tangible evidence be 
physically admitted at a trial ... Even when evidence 
is available it need not be physically offered. Thus, the 
grand larceny of an automobile may be established 
merely on competent testimony describing the stolen 
vehicle without actually producing the automobile before 
the trier of fact. Holle v. State, 26 Md. App. 267, 274, 
337 A.2d 163, 166-67 (1975) (stolen marked currency). 
Accord United States v. Figueroa, 618 F.2d 934, 941 (2d 
Cir. 1980) (heroin); Chandler v. United States, 318 F.2d 
356, 357 (10th Cir. 1963) (whiskey bottles). Finally, the so-
called "best evidence" rule applies only to writings, 
recordings, and photographs, not to real evidence. See 
Fed. R. Evid. 1002. 
Other Problems 
Nevertheless, the Florida Supreme Court has adopted 
a contrary position. According to the court, "when a 
defendant is charged with possession of a controlled 
substance, that substance, if available, must be intro-
duced into evidence." G.E.G. v. State, 417 So. 2d 975, 977 
(Fla. 1982). In support of this rule, the court wrote: 
An absolute rule that a substance may be introduced 
or not at the discretion of the prosecutor is practically 
undesirable because of its potential for abuse. For 
example, such prosecutorial discretion could deliber-
ately or unwittingly be used to confuse defense coun-
sel and thwart the ability to make certain objections, 
particularly objections to chain of custody ... 
The state's failure to introduce the substance in 
evidence against the defendant might put the defen-
dant in the awkward position of introducing it himself 
should he wish to challenge its authenticity where 
there has been testimony of its existence as here ... 
/d. at 977-78. 
In addition, the loss or destruction of the evidence after 
laboratory analysis may affect the defendant's right to 
reexamine the evidence, which could result in the exclu-
sion of expert testimony based on the prior laboratory 
examination. See 1 Giannelli & lmwinkelried, Scientific 
Evidence§ 3-7 (2d ed. 1993) (constitutional duty to 
preserve evidence). 
LINKS IN THE CHAIN 
The "links" in the chain of custody are those persons 
who have had physical custody of the object. Persons 
who have had access to, but not possession of, the 
evidence generally need not be accounted for. Such 
persons are not custodians. As noted by one court: 
"There is no rule requiring the prosecution to produce as 
witnesses all persons who were in a position to come into 
contact with the article sought to be introduced in 
evidence." Gallego v. United States, 276 F.2d 914, 917 
(9th Cir. 1960). 
Accord United States v. Fletcher, 487 F.2d 22, 23 (5th 
Cir. 1973) (fact that "fifteen persons had access to the 
evidence room" affects weight, not admissibility), cert. 
denied, 416 U.S. 958 (1974); Reyes v. United States, 383 
F.2d 734, 734 (9th Cir. 1967) ("(T)he Government was 
under no obligation to produce as witnesses all persons 
who may have handled exhibit 1"). 
Breaks 
Failure to account for the evidence during possession 
by a custodian, however, may constitute a critical break 
in the chain of custody- for example: 
United States v. Panczko, 353'F.2d 676, 679 (7th Cir. 
1965) ("There is no evidence as to where or from 
whom Lieutenant Remkus got the keys"), cert. 
denied, 383 U.S. 935 (1966); 
Novak v. District of Columbia, 160 F.2d 588, 589 (D.C. 
Cir. 1947) (evidence failed "to identify the sample 
from which the analyses were made as being that 
sample taken from the appellant"); 
Smith v. United States, 157 F.2d 705 (D.C. Cir. 1946) 
(witness testified that watch presented in court had 
been handed to him by police officer at scene but he 
did not see where officer obtained watch); 
United States v. Lewis, 19 M.J. 869 (A.F.C.M.R. 1985) 
(prosecution failed to show that urine sample ana-
lyzed at lab was the sample taken from the defendant). 
Testimony of Links 
Some courts have indicated that all the links in the 
chain of custody must testify at trial. E.g., People v. 
Connelly, 35 N.Y.2d 171, 174, 316 N.E.2d 706, 708,359 
N.Y.S.2d 266, 269 (1974) ("[A]dmissibility generally 
requires that all those who have handled the item 
'identify it and testify to its custody and unchanged 
condition' ").The prevalent view, however, is that "the 
fact of a 'missing link does not prevent the admission of 
real evidence, so long as there is sufficient proof that the 
evidence is what it purports to be.'" United States v. 
Howard-Arias, 679 F.2d 363,366 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 
459 u.s. 874 (1982). 
See also United States v. Harrington, 923 F.2d 1371, 
1374 (9th Cir.) ("[T]he prosecution was not required to call 
the custodian of the evidence"), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 
164 (1991); United States v. Cardenas, 864 F.2d 1528, 
1532 (10th Cir.) ("There is no rule that the prosecution 
must produce all persons who had custody of the 
evidence to testify at trial"), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 909 
{1989); People v. Jones, 148 Ill. App. 3d 345, 499 N.E.2d 
510, 514 {1986) {"A sufficient chain of custody does not 
require every person involved in the chain to testify"). 
Thus, while a custodian in the chain of possession 
need not testify under all circumstances, the evidence 
should be accounted for during the time it was under that 
custodian's control. Several recurrent examples of "miss-
ing link" cases are discussed below. 
Informants 
The authentication of evidence by means other than 
the testimony of custodial links frequently arises in drug 
cases where an informant who had handled the drugs 
does not testify at trial. In this situation, an undercover 
officer who had accompanied the informant can 'testify 
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about the informant's handling of the drugs. Thus, a 
noncustodian with first-hand knowledge may supply 
evidence of the object's handling while in the custody of 
the nontestifying informant. E.g., United States v. Jones, 
404 F. Supp. 529, 542 {E.D. Pa. 1975) (undercover agent 
observed defendant giving drugs to informant; informant 
did not testify), aff'd, 538 F.2d 321 (3d Cir. 1976). 
The testimony of a custodial link also may be 
dispensed with when circumstantial evidence sufficiently 
connects a defendant with drugs purchased from him by 
an informant, i.e. a "controlled drug buy." For example, in 
Peden v. United States, 223 F.2d 319 (D.C. Cir. 1955), 
cert. denied, 359 U.S. 971 (1959), an informant was 
searched prior to a drug transaction and provided with 
marked money. While under surveillance, she met the 
defendant, and both were immediately arrested and 
searched. The informant had morphine and the defen-
dant had the marked money. Although the informant did 
not testify, the court held the chain sufficient to connect 
the defendant with the morphine. /d. See also United 
States v. Amaro, 422 F.2d 1078, 1080 (9th Cir. 1970). 
Postal Employees 
Postal employees who handle evidence sent to a crime 
laboratory by mail are custodial links. Postal employees 
rarely, if ever, testify at trial, however. A rule requiring 
every custodian to testify would necessitate calling all 
postal employees who handled the evidence. This would 
"place an impossible burden upon the state." Trantham v. 
State, 508 P.2d 1104, 1107 (Okla. Grim. App. 1973). 
Therefore, courts invoke the presumption that "articles 
transported by regular United States mail and delivered 
in the ordinary course of the mails are delivered in 
substantially the same condition in which they were 
sent." Schacht v. State, 154 Neb. 858, 861, 50 N .W.2d 78, 
78 {1951). See also Pasadena Research Laboratories, 
Inc. v. United States, 169 F.2d 375, 382 (9th Cir.) 
{presumption of regularity applies to postal employees' 
handling of vials during shipment), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 
853 (1948); Rogers v. Commonwealth, 197 Va. 527, 531, 
90 S.E.2d 257,259-60 (1955) {"In proving identity legal 
presumptions may of course be relied upon unless 
rebutted, e.g., that articles regularly mailed are delivered 
in substantially the same condition in which they were 
sent"). 
But see Miller v. State, 484 So. 2d 1203, 1205 (Ala. 
Grim. App. 1986) (no presumption of delivery where 
blood specimen placed in agency's "regular outgoing 
mail" rather than U.S. mail). 
Many law enforcement agencies recommend regis-
tered mail or other similar means for sending evidence. 
F.B.I., supra at 103 ("Ship [physical evidence] by U.S. 
Postal Service, Registered Mail, United Parcel Service, 
Federal Express, or air freight"). See also United States 
v. Godoy, 528 F.2d 281, 283 {9th Cir. 1975) (narcotics sent 
by registered mail to laboratory); United States v. Jackson, 
482 F.2d 1266 (8th Cir. 1973) {registered, special delivery, 
air mail). 
Furthermore, the FBI recommends stringent packag-
ing requirements for items mailed to its laboratory. F.B.I., 
supra at 103 (use suitable containers, package each item 
separately, and seal securely). Proof that these proce-
dures were followed, and not the presumption of due 
delivery, assures the reliability of the evidence. 
Minor links 
Another category of cases involves what may be called 
"minor links"- intermediate custodians who had 
possession for a short period of time and merely passed 
the evidence along to another link. For example, in one 
case a chief chemist, who had received a sealed enve-
lope of heroin and then turned it over to the examining 
chemist, did not testify. The court upheld the admissibili-
ty of the evidence because the seal was "unbroken when 
the latter received it." United States v. Picard, 464 F.2d 
215, 216 n.1 (1st Cir. 1972). Accord United States v. 
Williams, 809 F.2d 75, 89-90 (1st Cir. 1986) (lab technician 
need not testify), cert. denied, 482 U.S. 906 (1987); Unit-
ed States v. Glaze, 643 F.2d 549, 552 (8th Cir. 1981) 
(nontestifying chemist received and transported narcot-
ics to testifying chemist). 
The category of minor links whose testimony is not 
required to establish a chain of custody includes not only 
laboratory personnel, but also police officers who receive 
evidence from a seizing officer and mail or transported it 
to a laboratory for analysis. E.g., United States v. Jones, 
404 F. Supp. 529, 543 (E. D. Pa. 1975) (testimony of officer 
who mailed heroin to lab not necessary where sealed 
packages initialed and return receipt introduced), aff'd, 
538 F.2d 321 (3d Cir. 1976); United States v. Lampson, 
627 F.2d 62, 65.(7th Cir. 1980) (deputy sheriff who trans-
ported evidence did not testify); Bay v. State, 489 N.E.2d 
1220, 1223 (Ind. App. 1986) (detective who transported 
marijuana to lab did not testify). 
See also State v. Goad, 692 S.W.2d 32, 36 (Tenn. Grim. 
App. 1985) (property room custodian need not testify); 
United States v. Cardenas, 864 F.2d 1528, 1532 (10th Cir.) 
(officer who carried cocaine to evidence room did not 
testify), cert. denied, 491 U.S. 909 (1989). 
In short, "accounting for" all the links in the chain of 
custody does not necessarily mean all the links need 
testify at trial. 
BURDEN AND STANDARD OF PROOF 
The burden of proving the chain of custody rests with 
the party offering the evidence. United States v. Santia-
go, 534 F.2d 768, 770 (7th Cir. 1976); 1 J. Wigmore, 
Evidence§ 18, at 841 (Tillers rev. 1983). 
Prior to the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evidence, 
the courts described the standard of proof in various 
ways. The most common expression of the standard was 
that the offering party had to establish the identity and 
condition of the exhibit by a "reasonable probability." 
E.g., United States v. Brown, 482 F.2d 1226, 1228 (8th Cir. 
1973) ("reasonable probability the article has not been 
changed in any important respect'); United States v. 
Robinson, 447 F.2d 1215, 1220 (D.C. Cir. 1971), rev'd on 
other grounds, 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
Phrases such as "reasonable certainty" and 
"reasonable assurance" seem only variants of this stan-
dard. United States v. Jones, 404 F. Supp. 529, 543 (E. D. 
Pa. 1975); State v. Cress, 344 A.2d 57, 61 (Me. 1975); 
State v. Baines, 394 S.W.2d 312,316 (Mo. 1965), cert. 
denied, 384 U.S. 992 (1966). 
The reasonable probability standard appears to 
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require no more than the "preponderance of evidence" 
or "more probable than not" standard. See People v. 
Riser, 47 Cal. 2d 566, 580-81, 305 P.2d 1, 10 ("The 
requirement of reasonable certainty is not met when 
some vital link in the chain of possession is not account-
ed for, because then it is as likely as not that the evidence 
analyzed was not the evidence originally received"), 
appeal dismissed, 358 U.S. 646 (1959). 
Moreover, chain of custody "requirements go to the 
competency of the evidence, not merely to its credibility." 
State v. Serl, 269 N.W.2d 785, 789 (S.D. 1978). Under this 
view, the trial court determines whether this standard has 
been satisfied. "That determination is to be made by the 
trial judge, not the jury ... " United States v. Brown, 482 
F.2d 1226, 1228 (8th Cir. 1973). Accord United States v. 
Daughtry, 502 F.2d 1019, 1021-23 (5th Cir. 1974); United 
States v. Stevenson, 445 F.2d 25, 27 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 404 U.S. 857 (1971). 
Federal Rules 
In contrast, Federal Rule 901(a) requires only that the 
offering party introduce "evidence sufficient to support a 
finding that the matter in question is what its proponent 
claims." Thus, the trial court does not decide finally or 
exclusively whether the item has been identified; rather, 
the court decides only whether sufficient evidence has 
been introduced from which a reasonable jury could 
find the evidence identified. See Zenith Radio Corp. v. 
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 505 F. Supp. 1190, 1219 (E.D. 
Pa. 1980) ("The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 104(b) 
makes plain that preliminary questions of conditional 
relevancy are not determined solely by the judge, for to 
do so would greatly restrict the function of the jury .... "), 
rev'd on other grounds, 723 F.2d 238 (3d Cir. 1983), rev'd, 
475 u.s. 574 (1986). 
In other words, the offering party need only make a 
"prima facie" showing of authenticity to gain admissibili-
ty, and the jury decides finally whether the evidence has 
been sufficiently identified. See United States v. Goichman, 
547 F.2d 778, 784 (3d Cir. 1976) ('[l]t is the jury who will 
ultimately determine the authenticity of the evidence, not 
the court"). 
Whether the Federal Rules of Evidence were intended 
to effect a major change in the chain of custody require-
ments is unclear. Two commentators have written that 
"Rule 901(a) can easily be read as doing away with any 
chain of custody requirement." S. Saltzburg & M. Martin, 
Federal Rules of Evidence Manual 478 (5th ed. 1990). 
Several decisions of the Fifth Circuit contain language 
that supports this view. For example, the court has writ-
ten that "chain of custody goes to the weight rather than 
the admissibility of the evidence, and is thus reserved for 
the jury." Ballou v. Henri Studios, Inc., 656 F.2d 1147, 1154 
(5th Cir. 1981). Accord United States v. Shaw, 920 F.2d 
1225, 1229-30 (5th Cir.) ("any break in the chain of custo-
dy of physical evidence does not render the evidence 
inadmissible but instead goes to the weight that the jury 
should accord that evidence."), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 
2038 (1991). 
The Second Circuit also appears to have adopted this 
less stringent standard: "Fed.R.Evid. 901 requires that to 
meet the admissibility threshold the government need 
only prove a rational basis for concluding that an exhibit 
is what it is claimed to be." United States v. Han, 904 F.2d 
803, 809 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 789 (1991). 
Other federal courts of appeal, however, continue to 
apply the pre-Rule's "reasonable probability" standard. 
E.g., United States v. Harrington, 923 F.2d 1371, 1374 (9th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 164 (1991); United States v. 
Cardenas, 864 F.2d 1528, 1532 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 
491 U.S. 909 (1989); United States v. Rans, 851 F.2d 1111, 
1114 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. Roberts, 844F.2d 
537, 550 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 867 (1988). 
In United States v. Ladd, 885 F.2d 954 (1st Cir. 1989), 
the First Circuit stated the rule as follows: 
In the last analysis, the prosecution's chain-of-custody 
evidence must be adequate:-- not infallible. Here, 
some links in the chain were rusty, but none were 
missing. Without question, the defense succeeded in 
showing a certain sloppiness, regrettable in a forensic 
laboratory. Yet the net effect of any such disarray on 
the authenticity of the evidence depended on what 
inferences a reasonable factfinder might choose to 
draw from it. Where, as in this case, a trier chooses 
among plausible (albeit competing) inferences, 
appellate courts should not intrude. /d. at 957. 
Accordingly, the evidence was admissible. The same 
court, however, ruled that another item of evidence 
should have been excluded due to a "missing link" that 
resulted from a discrepancy between laboratory identifi-
cation numbers: "In short, there was no competent proof 
to indicate that the sample extracted from Massey's 
corpse was the one which CSL tested. An important 
step in the custodial pavane was omitted." 885 F.2d at 
957. See also Kennedy v. State, 578 N.E.2d 633, 639 
(Ind. 1991) ('[T]he State need not establish a perfect 
chain of custody, and any gaps go to the weight of the 
evidence and not its admissibility'), cert. denied, 112 S. 
Ct. 1299 (1992). 
Application of the Standard of Proof 
To satisfy its burden of proof, the prosecution need not 
eliminate every possibility of substitution, alteration, or 
tampering. The "mere possibility of a break in the chain 
does not render the physical evidence inadmissible, but 
raises the question of weight to be accorded by the 
jury ... " United States v. Jardina, 747 F.2d 945, 951 (5th 
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1058 (1985). According-
ly, discrepancies are not always fatal. Numerous cases 
hold that minor discrepancies affect the weight and not 
admissibility of the evidence: 
Incorrect weight: United States v. Godoy, 528 F.2d 
281, 283 (9th Cir. 1975); People v. Zipprich, 141 Ill. App. 
3d 123, 490 N.E.2d 8, 10-11 (1986); People v. Julian, 41 
N.Y.2d 340, 342, 360 N.E.2d 1310, 1312, 392 N.Y.S.2d 
610, 612 (1977). 
Incorrect number: United States v. Han, 904 F.2d 
803, 810 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 789 
(1991); United States v. Clark, 425 F.2d 827, 833 (3d 
Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 820 (1970). 
Incorrect date: United States v. Barcella, 432 F.2d 
570, 572 (1st Cir. 1970); State v. Smith, 463 So. 2d 1003, 
1005 (La. App. 1985). 
Incorrect labeling: United States v. Allocco, 234 F.2d 
955, 956 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 931 (1956); 
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Ingle v. State, 1761nd. App. 695, 707,377 N.E.2d 885, 
892 (1975); State v. Beaudoin, 386 A.2d 731, 733 (Me. 
1978); Renner v, Commissioner of Pub. Safety, 373 
N.W.2d 628, 632 (Minn. App. 1985). 
In satisfying its burden of proof, the prosecution is 
frequently aided by the "presumption of regularity." As 
one court has commented: 
In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the trial 
judge was entitled to assume that this official would 
not tamper with the sack and can or their contents. 
Where no evidence indicating otherwise is produced, 
the presumption of regularity supports the official acts 
of public officers, and courts presume that they have 
properly discharged their official duties. Gallego v. 
United States, 276 F.2d 914, 917 (9th Cir. 1960). 
Accord United States v. Lott, 854 F.2d 244,250 (7th Cir. 
1988); United States v. Olson, 846 F.2d 1103, 1116 (7th 
Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 850 (1988). 
The presumption of regularity, however, has been criti-
cized by some courts: 
The presumption of regularity, if it can be dignified as a 
rule, does not serve as a substitute for evidence when 
authenticity is, as here, challenged on not insubstantial 
grounds. At best it may relieve the government of the 
necessity for offering proof of custody until the integrity 
of the evidence has been put in issue. United States v. 
Starks, 515 F.2d 112, 122 (3d Cir. 1975) 
See also United States v. Lampson, 627 F. 2d 62,65 
(7th Cir. 1980) ("The Government's burden ... cannot be 
diluted by unwarranted presumptions about the evidence 
it seeks to introduce"); Bauer v. Veith, 374 Mich. 1, 3, 130 
N.W.2d 897, 899 (1964) (presumption cannot be used to 
"supply missing links in the chain"); 9 J. Wigmore, 
Evidence§ 2534, at 488 (3d ed. 1940) (presumption of 
regularity "more often mentioned than enforced"). 
METHODS OF PROOF 
A chain of custody may be established in a number of 
ways, some of which are discussed below. 
Stipulation 
The chain may be the subject of a stipulation. See . 
People v. Perine, 82111. App. 3d 610, 612,402 N.E.2d 847, 
849 (1980) (chain of custody stipulated); People v. 
Maurice, 31 Ill. 2d 456, 458, 202 N.E.2d 480, 481 (1964) 
(stipulation failed to state that the material seized from 
defendant was same material tested by chemist; admis-
sion held error); State v. Lagasse, 410 A.2d 537, 541 (Me. 
1980) (stipulation that police maintained proper chain of 
custody of knife while in their possession). 
Refreshing Recollection 
If the chain of custody is established by the testimony 
of the persons ("links") who had possession of the 
object, these witnesses may refresh their recollections 
by referring to any available documentation. See Fed. R. 
Evid. 612 (use of writings to refresh memory); United 
States v. Stevenson, 445 F.2d 25, 27 (7th Cir.) (in estab-
lishing chain of custody, officers "refreshed their 
recollection from official records"), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 
857 (1971). 
·Habit and Routine Practice Evidence 
The proponent may also introduce evidence of habit or 
routine practice to establish the chain of custody. Federal 
Rule 406 provides that "(e]vidence of the habit of a 
person or of the routine practice of an organization .. : 
is relevant to prove that the conduct of the person or 
organization on a particular occasion was in conformity 
with the habit or routine practice." 
Accordingly, evidence of the standard operating proce-
dures of police departments and laboratories in 
safeguarding real evidence may be used to establish the 
chain of custody. See United States v. Jones, 687 F.2d 
1265, 1267 (8th Cir. 1982) (evidence handled by govern-
ment according to "established procedures"); United 
States v. Luna, 585 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir.) ("normal police 
procedure"), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 852 (1978); State v. 
Conley, 32 Ohio App. 2d 54, 62, 288 N.E.2d 296, 302 
(1971) ("standard operating procedure" of laboratory). 
Documentary Evidence 
Sometimes the chain of custody has been established 
by documentary evidence. E.g., United Statesv. Luna, 
585 F.2d 1, 6 (1st Cir.) (police "accounted for the 
evidence, either by official records or by testimony 
concerning normal police procedure"), cert. denied, 439 
U.S. 852 (1978); Graham v. State, 2531nd. 525, 533,255 
N.E.2d 652, 654 (1970) ("police custody records" may be 
used to establish chain of custody). 
For example, courts have held that laboratory slides 
and labels on specimen bottles fall within the federal 
Business Records Act because they had been prepared 
by hospital personnel in the regular course of business. 
See United States v. Duhart, 496 F.2d 941, 944 (9th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 419 U.S. 967 (1974); Gass v. United States, 
416 F.2d 767, 771 (D.C. Cir. 1969). 
These cases, however, predate the adoption of the 
Federal Rules of Evidence. Federal Rule 803(8)(8), which 
governs the public records exception, specifically 
excludes "in criminal cases matters observed by police 
officers and other law enforcement personnel." Accord-
ing to the legislative history, this exclusion was based on 
the belief that "observations by police officers at the 
scene of the crime or the apprehension of the defendant 
are not as reliable as observations by public officials in 
other cases because of the adversarial nature of the 
confrontation between the police and the defendant in 
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criminal cases." S. Rep. No. 1277,93 Gong., 2d Sess. 17, 
reprinted in 1974 U.S. Code Gong. & Ad. News 7051,7064. 
The scope of the police records exclusion has divided 
the courts. Some courts seem to apply a per se rule, 
under which all police reports are automatically exclud-
ed, United States v. Ruffin, 575 F.2d 346, 356 (2d Cir. 
1978); United States v. Oates, 560 F.2d 45, 67 (2d Cir. 
1977), while others have adopted a more flexible 
approach. For example, some courts have held that 
Congress "did not intend to exclude (police] records of 
routine, nonadversarial matters." United States v. 
Hernandez-Rajas, 617 F.2d 533, 535 (9th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 449 U.S. 864 (1980); United States v. Orozco, 590 
F.2d 789, 793 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1049 
(1979). It may be that chain of custody records will be 
considered routine nonadversarial records. 
United States v. Coleman, 631 F.2d 908 (D.C. Cir. 
1980), is one of the few cases dealing with the admissibil-
ity of chain of custody documents under the Federal 
Rules. The defendant contended that police reports are 
never admissible when offered by the prosecution, and 
thus DEA forms of chemical analysis and lock-seal enve-
lopes containing notations of the date, time, and location 
of the sale of heroin and an identification of the seller by 
a John Doe number were inadmissible. The court reject-
ed this argument, holding that the documents were not 
unreliable on the ground that they were prepared for the 
purpose of litigation. Although the court recognized that 
the forms "have certain indicia of 'police reports,' " it 
found that the forms and lock-sealed envelopes 
contained "only skeletal information, and are prepared 
not solely with an eye towards presentation, but towards 
preserving a record of the chain of custody." /d. at 912. 
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